Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
Fu, H. Sun, Y. Yannelis, N.C. Zhang, Z.
Fu, H.
Yannelis, N.C.
Zhang, Z.
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Abstract
We introduce a new game form which allows the players' strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players' payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players' strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.©2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Journal of Mathematical Economics
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Date
2007
DOI
10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001
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Article