Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2013.797120
Title: Container transshipment and port competition
Authors: Bae, M.J.
Chew, E.P. 
Lee, L.H. 
Zhang, A.
Issue Date: Sep-2013
Source: Bae, M.J., Chew, E.P., Lee, L.H., Zhang, A. (2013-09). Container transshipment and port competition. Maritime Policy and Management 40 (5) : 479-494. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2013.797120
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study container port competition for transshipment cargo in duopoly market. We develop the linear container handling demand function which incorporates transshipment traffic, and apply a non-cooperative two-stage game to a vertical-structure seaport market with ports as upstream players and shipping lines as downstream players. The drivers behind port competition are explained through existence of the unique Nash equilibrium which incorporates shipping lines' port call decisions and ports' pricing strategies. A port collusion model and social optimum model are then analysed for further insights, and a numerical simulation is conducted to demonstrate the results. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Source Title: Maritime Policy and Management
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/63067
ISSN: 03088839
DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2013.797120
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

16
checked on Dec 14, 2017

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

16
checked on Nov 20, 2017

Page view(s)

60
checked on Dec 10, 2017

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.