Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||A method for evaluating the behavior of power indices in weighted plurality games|
|Citation:||Chua, V.C.H., Ueng, C.H., Huang, H.C. (2002-07). A method for evaluating the behavior of power indices in weighted plurality games. Social Choice and Welfare 19 (3) : 665-680. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100144|
|Abstract:||In this paper, a systematic method to facilitate the comparison of a priori measures of power in an n-player r-candidate (n, r) weighted plurality game is proposed. This method, which exploits the notion of a structure of embedded winning coalitions (SEWC), enables the listing of all power profiles relevant to an (n, r) game under a given index and permits the computation of the probability of occurrence of each of these profiles. The vulnerability of an index to different paradoxes of power can also be systematically studied. For the purpose of illustration, we apply this method to the analysis of four well-known 2-candidate power indices namely the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, the Johnston index and the Deegan-Packel index. In each case, the set of power profiles and the likelihood of occurrence of each of these profiles are enumerated. The superadditivity property of these indices is also studied.|
|Source Title:||Social Choice and Welfare|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Feb 13, 2019
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Feb 4, 2019
checked on Dec 29, 2018
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.