Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences|
|Authors:||Chen, Y.-C. |
|Citation:||Chen, Y.-C., Luo, X. (2012-08). An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences. Economic Theory 51 (1) : 1-12. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0|
|Abstract:||In this paper, we show that, in the class of games where each player's strategy space is compact Hausdorff and each player's payoff function is continuous and "concave-like," rationalizability in a variety of general preference models yields the unique set of outcomes of iterated strict dominance. The result implies that rationalizable strategic behavior in these preference models is observationally indistinguishable from that in the subjective expected utility model, in this class of games. Our indistinguishability result can be applied not only to mixed extensions of finite games, but also to other important applications in economics, for example, the Cournot-oligopoly model. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.|
|Source Title:||Economic Theory|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Jul 17, 2018
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Jun 27, 2018
checked on Jun 22, 2018
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.