Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0
Title: An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
Authors: Chen, Y.-C. 
Luo, X. 
Keywords: General preferences
Iterated dominance
Rationalizability
Issue Date: Aug-2012
Source: Chen, Y.-C., Luo, X. (2012-08). An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences. Economic Theory 51 (1) : 1-12. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0
Abstract: In this paper, we show that, in the class of games where each player's strategy space is compact Hausdorff and each player's payoff function is continuous and "concave-like," rationalizability in a variety of general preference models yields the unique set of outcomes of iterated strict dominance. The result implies that rationalizable strategic behavior in these preference models is observationally indistinguishable from that in the subjective expected utility model, in this class of games. Our indistinguishability result can be applied not only to mixed extensions of finite games, but also to other important applications in economics, for example, the Cournot-oligopoly model. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
Source Title: Economic Theory
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52111
ISSN: 09382259
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0
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