Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.002
Title: Large games with a bio-social typology
Authors: Khan, M.A.
Rath, K.P.
Sun, Y. 
Yu, H.
Keywords: Asymptotic implementation
Closed-graph property
Idealized limit game
Large games
Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
Saturated probability space
Social-type
Traits
Upper hemi-continuity
Issue Date: May-2013
Citation: Khan, M.A., Rath, K.P., Sun, Y., Yu, H. (2013-05). Large games with a bio-social typology. Journal of Economic Theory 148 (3) : 1122-1149. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.002
Abstract: We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for player's names. In a sufficiently general context of traits and actions, we address this dissonance by showing a saturated probability space as being a necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and upper hemi-continuity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits. We illustrate the idealized results by corresponding asymptotic results for an increasing sequence of finite games. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
Source Title: Journal of Economic Theory
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/52093
ISSN: 00220531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.002
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