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|Title:||A not-so-simple view of intentional action|
|Source:||Chan, D.K. (1999-03). A not-so-simple view of intentional action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1) : 1-16. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.|
|Abstract:||The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary with the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional. © 1999 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.|
|Source Title:||Pacific Philosophical Quarterly|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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