Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x
Title: Folk moral relativism
Authors: Sarkissian, H.
Park, J.
Tien, D. 
Wright, J.C.
Knobe, J.
Issue Date: Sep-2011
Citation: Sarkissian, H., Park, J., Tien, D., Wright, J.C., Knobe, J. (2011-09). Folk moral relativism. Mind and Language 26 (4) : 482-505. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x
Abstract: It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on the degree to which they consider radically different perspectives on moral questions. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Source Title: Mind and Language
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/50032
ISSN: 02681064
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x
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