Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/47358
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dc.titleEconomies and Games with Many Agents
dc.contributor.authorSUN XIANG
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-31T18:00:52Z
dc.date.available2013-10-31T18:00:52Z
dc.date.issued2013-05-20
dc.identifier.citationSUN XIANG (2013-05-20). Economies and Games with Many Agents. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/47358
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, we consider three economic models with many agents, independent random partial matchings with general types, large games with actions in infinite-dimensional Banach spaces, and private information economies. (1). For independent random partial matchings with general types, we formally formulate the independent random partial matching with general types, establish its existence, and show the exact law of large numbers of it. (2). For large games with actions in infinite-dimensional Banach spaces, we find a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (3). For private information economies, we consider Radner equilibrium, private core and insurance equilibrium, and show that they are not incentive compatible.
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectIndependent random matching, large game, private information economy
dc.typeThesis
dc.contributor.departmentMATHEMATICS
dc.contributor.supervisorSUN YENENG
dc.contributor.supervisorLUO XIAO
dc.description.degreePh.D
dc.description.degreeconferredDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
dc.identifier.isiutNOT_IN_WOS
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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