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|Title:||Control mechanisms, key personnel appointment, control and performance of Sino-Singaporean joint ventures|
|Authors:||Wang, P. |
Sino-Singaporean joint ventures
|Source:||Wang, P.,Wee, C.H.,Koh, P.H. (1998). Control mechanisms, key personnel appointment, control and performance of Sino-Singaporean joint ventures. International Business Review 7 (4) : 351-375. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.|
|Abstract:||The results of a questionnaire survey of 132 managers and personal interviews of 40 managers showed that the ranking of the importance of different mechanisms used to exercise control over Sino-Singaporean joint ventures (JVs) differed, depending on the equity stakes of the Singaporean parent firms. This study also found that the majority of Singaporean parent firms had the right to appoint the general manager, chairman of the board, and the financial manager of their China subsidiaries. When compared with firms without the right to appoint personnel to key positions in the JVs, those Singaporean parent firms with the right to do so felt that they had greater control over their China subsidiaries and they were also more satisfied with the performance of these subsidiaries.|
|Source Title:||International Business Review|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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