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|Title:||Contest design and optimal endogenous entry|
|Authors:||Fu, Q. |
|Source:||Fu, Q., Lu, J. (2010). Contest design and optimal endogenous entry. Economic Inquiry 48 (1) : 80-88. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00135.x|
|Abstract:||This paper derives the effort-maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs. The organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments: the value of the prize purse and a monetary transfer (entry subsidy/fee) to each participating contestant. The results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants. The direction (subsidy or fee) and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost. © 2008 Western Economic Association International.|
|Source Title:||Economic Inquiry|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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