Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
Title: Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations
Authors: Schweinsberg, M.
Ku, G.
Wang, C.S. 
Pillutla, M.M.
Keywords: Anchor
First offer
Impasse
Negotiation
Issue Date: 2012
Source: Schweinsberg, M., Ku, G., Wang, C.S., Pillutla, M.M. (2012). Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1) : 226-231. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
Abstract: Most research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
Source Title: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44649
ISSN: 00221031
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.005
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