Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Agency risk control through reprisal|
|Authors:||Lu, Q. |
Investment decision process
|Citation:||Lu, Q., Hwang, P., Wang, C.K. (2006). Agency risk control through reprisal. Journal of Business Venturing 21 (3) : 369-384. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2005.08.001|
|Abstract:||We study agency risk control by venture capital (VC) firms to highlight the importance of VC reprisal ability. The central thesis of this paper is that a VC firm's due diligence effort as an ex ante screening for agency risk is contingent upon its ex post reprisal ability. Applying to the context of emerging markets, we develop a testable hypothesis and empirically test it using data from Singapore market. It is found that foreign VC firms that are relatively weak in reprisal ability spend more effort in due diligence screening compared to local VC firms. © Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.|
|Source Title:||Journal of Business Venturing|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on May 20, 2018
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Apr 10, 2018
checked on May 12, 2018
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.