Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2005.08.001
Title: Agency risk control through reprisal
Authors: Lu, Q. 
Hwang, P. 
Wang, C.K.
Keywords: Agency risk
Investment decision process
Reprisal ability
Venture capital
Issue Date: 2006
Source: Lu, Q., Hwang, P., Wang, C.K. (2006). Agency risk control through reprisal. Journal of Business Venturing 21 (3) : 369-384. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2005.08.001
Abstract: We study agency risk control by venture capital (VC) firms to highlight the importance of VC reprisal ability. The central thesis of this paper is that a VC firm's due diligence effort as an ex ante screening for agency risk is contingent upon its ex post reprisal ability. Applying to the context of emerging markets, we develop a testable hypothesis and empirically test it using data from Singapore market. It is found that foreign VC firms that are relatively weak in reprisal ability spend more effort in due diligence screening compared to local VC firms. © Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Source Title: Journal of Business Venturing
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/44285
ISSN: 08839026
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2005.08.001
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