Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests|
|Authors:||Fu, Q. |
|Citation:||Fu, Q., Lu, J. (2009). The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests. Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1) : 146-161. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.006|
|Abstract:||This paper examines the variation in total effort expended by participants when prizes are awarded in a grand contest as opposed to a number of subcontests. When contestants are homogeneous, under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), a grand contest generates more effort than any set of subcontests. When no restrictions are placed on the contest technology, the results further demonstrate an "increasing-return-to-scale" property such that each individual responds to a proportional increase in the number of contestants and the number of each prize by increasing individual effort. Therefore, when a collection of identical subcontests forms a grand contest, the total effort always increases and the grand contest leads to a higher rent-dissipation rate. Our results apply to a wide variety of competitive activities, such as high-profile sports (e.g., diving and gymnastics in the Olympic Games), the internal labor market and the "quota" system for public resource allocation. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.|
|Source Title:||Games and Economic Behavior|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
checked on Jul 13, 2018
WEB OF SCIENCETM
checked on Jun 13, 2018
checked on Jun 22, 2018
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.