Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993806.1993872
Title: Sustaining collaboration in multicast despite rational collusion
Authors: Yu, H. 
Gibbons, P.B.
Shi, C.
Keywords: dcast
multicast
rational collusion
sybil attack
Issue Date: 2011
Source: Yu, H.,Gibbons, P.B.,Shi, C. (2011). Sustaining collaboration in multicast despite rational collusion. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing : 337-338. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1145/1993806.1993872
Abstract: This paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. Existing proposals on the problem are no longer able to provide proper incentives when rational users collude or launch sybil attacks. To overcome this key limitation, we propose a novel decentralized DCast multicast protocol and prove that it offers a novel concept of safety-net guarantee: A user running the protocol will always obtain at least a reasonably good utility despite the deviation of any number of rational users that potentially collude or launch sybil attacks. © 2011 Authors.
Source Title: Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/40281
ISBN: 9781450307192
DOI: 10.1145/1993806.1993872
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