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|Title:||Dsybil: Optimal Sybil-resistance for recommendation systems|
|Authors:||Yu, H. |
|Citation:||Yu, H., Shi, C., Kaminsky, M., Gibbons, P.B., Xiao, F. (2009). Dsybil: Optimal Sybil-resistance for recommendation systems. Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy : 283-298. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2009.26|
|Abstract:||Recommendation systems can be attacked in various ways, and the ultimate attack form is reached with a sybil attack, where the attacker creates a potentially unlimited number of sybil identities to vote. Defending against sybil attacks is often quite challenging, and the nature of recommendation systems makes it even harder. This paper presents DSybil, a novel defense for diminishing the influence of sybil identities in recommendation systems. DSybil provides strong provable guarantees that hold even under the worst-case attack and are optimal. DSybil can defend against an unlimited number of sybil identities over time. DSybil achieves its strong guarantees by i) exploiting the heavy-tail distribution of the typical voting behavior of the honest identities, and ii) carefully identifying whether the system is already getting "enough help" from the (weighted) voters already taken into account or whether more "help" is needed. Our evaluation shows that DSybil would continue to provide high-quality recommendations even when a millionnode botnet uses an optimal strategy to launch a sybil attack. © 2009 IEEE.|
|Source Title:||Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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