Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/39840
Title: An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers
Authors: Pham, H.N.
Teo, Y.M. 
Thoai, N.
Nguyen, T.A.
Keywords: incentive compatible
Mechanism design
Monopoly
VCG
Issue Date: 2009
Source: Pham, H.N.,Teo, Y.M.,Thoai, N.,Nguyen, T.A. (2009). An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers. Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology Series 99 : 77-83. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Market-based approaches proposed recently proved to be promising for competitive resource sharing in peer-to-peer and grid computing. Many approaches leverage on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to achieve incentive compatibility which embraces truthful bidding of participating agents. This paper addresses a deciency of VCG that to the best of our knowledge has not been studied. When one or more agents possess a large portion of the market share of resource, a monopoly situation arises. Applying VCG mechanism does not lead to an allocation because the second price cannot be mathematically determined. Using both theoretical and simulation analysis, we show the importance of addressing this problem. Our results show that monopoly situation arises in many types of market settings, from auction to exchange, and with a relatively high occurrence rate. To address this, we propose a new pricing method suitable for many market settings that achieve budget balanced and economic efficiency but relax the strategy proof property. © 2009, Australian Computer Society, Inc.
Source Title: Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology Series
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/39840
ISBN: 9781920682804
ISSN: 14451336
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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