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|Title:||SybilGuard: Defending against sybil attacks via social networks|
|Authors:||Yu, H. |
|Citation:||Yu, H., Kaminsky, M., Gibbons, P.B., Flaxman, A.D. (2008). SybilGuard: Defending against sybil attacks via social networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 16 (3) : 576-589. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2008.923723|
|Abstract:||Peer-to-peer and other decentralized, distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack, a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system, the malicious user is able to "out vote"the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks. Our protocol is based on the "social network"among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately small "cut"in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create. We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally. © 2008 IEEE.|
|Source Title:||IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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