Mitigating Human-elephant conflicts in Xishuangbanna, China

Abstract

Insurance is popularized to encourage coexistence by reimbursing farmer?s loss to wildlife. China also introduced an insurance scheme to mitigate human-elephant conflict in Xishuangbanna. However, the current scheme performed in a traditionally centralized way that my hinder effective funding allocation. To optimize funds and ensure mitigation efficiency, we deliberated an actuarial insurance model of rubber (the most important cash crop in Xishuangbanna) incorporating explicitly spatial risk and Net Present Value of rubber at damage, and estimated the anticipated payouts at village and town levels. The results showed that risk was unevenly distributed, so was cost and payouts. Additionally, to complement current compensation insufficiency and to reinforce program sustainability, we considered an insurance cost-sharing mechanism jointly paid by government, rubber farmers and Chinese tourists. The results showed that multiple stakeholds were willing to be involved and to support elephant conservation in the long run.