Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/27904
Title: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL OF STATE-HELD LISTED COMPANIES IN CHINA
Authors: CAO HAIJING
Keywords: Corporate governance, Listed company, China, Company Law, Board structure, Rule of law
Issue Date: 20-Jul-2009
Source: CAO HAIJING (2009-07-20). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL OF STATE-HELD LISTED COMPANIES IN CHINA. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis explores the corporate governance model in state-held listed companies in China. The following research questions are addressed: (1) What is the current corporate governance model of state-held listed companies in China? (2) Are state-held listed companies well governed under the current corporate governance model? (3) If the answer to the second research question is negative, then is there any other model under which state-held listed companies may be well governed? The ¿state-controlled¿ model that directs the corporate governance of state-held listed companies in China has common elements with the bank-based model, under which banks play a predominant role in corporate financing in a weak securities market. It also contains the employee participation element of the stakeholder model, but the trade unions in China are still strictly controlled by the government. The state-controlled model relates to the issue of how the state assets of China were and are managed, which is at the very ¿intersection¿ of political control and economic reform. It is the state-controlled model that has led to China¿s unique earmarks of two-tier share market and two-tier board structure. This thesis argues that state-held listed companies in China are not well-governed under the state-controlled model, because it fails to protect minority shareholders and the two-tier board structure does not perform efficiently due to poor law enforcement arising from corruption in China. The state-controlled listed companies would be better governed under a ¿law-controlled model¿ rather than a ¿state-controlled model.¿ This new model would improve the corporate governance of state-held listed companies by virtue of implementing the rule of law in China (or at least the ¿thin¿ rule of law in transition from ¿rule by law¿). Failing that, the practical issues arising from ¿state-controlled model¿ could be addressed by (i) reforming the laws; and (ii) enforcing the laws (including improving the anti-corruption supervisory regime and effecting judicial independence).
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/27904
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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