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|Title:||Bayesian coalitional rationalizability|
|Authors:||Luo, X. |
|Citation:||Luo, X., Yang, C.-C. (2009). Bayesian coalitional rationalizability. Journal of Economic Theory 144 (1) : 248-263. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.004|
|Abstract:||In this paper we extend Ambrus's [A. Ambrus, Coalitional rationalizability, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (2006) 903-929] concept of "coalitional rationalizability (c-rationalizability)" to situations where, in seeking mutually beneficial interests, players in groups (i) make use of Bayes' rule in expectation calculations and (ii) contemplate various deviations, i.e., the validity of deviation is checked against any arbitrary sets of strategies, and not just only against restricted subsets of strategies. We offer an alternative notion of Bayesian c-rationalizability suitable for such complex social interactions. We show that Bayesian c-rationalizability possesses nice properties similar to those of conventional rationalizability.©2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.|
|Source Title:||Journal of Economic Theory|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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