Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/17368
Title: General equilibrium with negligible private information
Authors: WU LEI
Keywords: Private Information Economy, Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Private Core, Bargaining set, Equivalence Theorem, Incentive compatibility
Issue Date: 16-Jul-2009
Source: WU LEI (2009-07-16). General equilibrium with negligible private information. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis studies various aspects of Private Information Economy (PIE) model in which agents are asymmetrically informed and have negligible influence individually. We formulate Rader¿s Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) in our framework and show the existence of efficient and incentive compatible REE at which the resulting price is constant or state contingent. Inspired by Radner¿s REE, we introduce a new concept of equilibrium called REE with Aggregate Signals in which agents make inferences about uncertainty from the information transmitted in commodity prices and empirical signal distribution. Existence of efficient and incentive compatible REE with aggregate signal has been shown. This thesis also explores different concepts of solutions for the PIE model. We prove the equivalence between Radner Equilibrium (aka Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium), Private Core and Insurance Equilibrium. In the last part, the Mas-Collel¿s notion of bargaining set is introduced and we prove the equivalence between efficient bargaining set allocation and Walrasian equilibrium.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/17368
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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