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Title: Leibniz' Metaphysics of Intentionality
Keywords: Leibniz, intentionality, relations, ideas, concepts, scholasticism
Issue Date: 7-Jan-2009
Source: JONATHAN CHARLES REYNOLD HILL (2009-01-07). Leibniz' Metaphysics of Intentionality. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: I consider Leibniz' views on intentionality in relation to his metaphysics. The scholastics developed a "package" of metaphysical claims which underlay a common approach to intentionality. These claims were that relations have reality outside the mind; that God's ideas function as exemplars of their objects; and that the mind abstracts "intelligible species" from the objects of perception. This "package" allowed the scholastics to hold that a thought of something is linked to its object by the relations of both similarity and causation. I argue that Leibniz held views that were structurally similar to the "package", and he held a similar approach to intentionality. For Leibniz, to think of or perceive an object is for the mind to take on a state that is structurally similar to that object. Moreover, there is a (quasi-) causal chain between a state of mind and its external object, even if the object isn't actual.
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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