Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/147005
Title: STABLE MATCHING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.
Authors: XU WENXUAN
Keywords: two-sided matching, incomplete information, mechanism design
Issue Date: 9-Apr-2018
Citation: XU WENXUAN (2018-04-09). STABLE MATCHING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This paper proposes a mechanism for the organization of an incomplete information matching market. We study a general class of matching problems with incomplete information where the payo of individual agents exhibit an assortativeness property. Our mechanism, functioning through a centralized clearing system for matching agents, is able to provide simple, stable and e cient solutions to matching games, with only information on the type distribution of agents and the agents' payo from each matching. Our main result nds restriction on payo s that this mechanism requires in order to guarantee a stable, assortative outcome. The mechanism acts as a counterpart to the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm in the incomplete information case.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/147005
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses (Restricted)

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
Xu Wenxuan AY1718 Sem 2.pdf670.94 kBAdobe PDF

RESTRICTED

NoneLog In

Page view(s)

71
checked on Sep 20, 2018

Download(s)

5
checked on Sep 20, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.