Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/146981
Title: DEMAND REDUCTION IN REPEATED AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM COE AUCTIONS.
Authors: KUA CHUN KIAT, EUGENE
Keywords: Repeated Auctions, COE, Multi-Unit Demand, Uniform Price Auction
Issue Date: 9-Apr-2018
Citation: KUA CHUN KIAT, EUGENE (2018-04-09). DEMAND REDUCTION IN REPEATED AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM COE AUCTIONS.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis examined uniform price auctions with multi-unit demand in repeated auctions using a two-stage model with dual-unit demand bidders. We find that standard results about demand reduction do not necessarily hold in the case of repeated auctions. In repeated auctions, not only do bidders have an incentive to shade their bids on the first unit, their bid on the first unit is also dependent on the marginal value for their second unit. Thus, bid curves in repeated auctions are generally gentler than predicted by standard results. Our theoretical findings is also supported by our empirical analysis in the context of COE auctions in Singapore. We found evidence that the bid curve submitted by bidders is gentler than the demand curve in COE auctions, in contrast to conventional prediction.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/146981
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses (Restricted)

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
Kua Chun Kiat Eugene AY1718 Sem 2.pdf321.37 kBAdobe PDF

RESTRICTED

NoneLog In

Page view(s)

1
checked on Sep 13, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.