Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/146628
Title: RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT VOLITIONAL CONTROL
Authors: YEO XIAO FENG KAINE
Keywords: Moral, Responsibility, Control, Decision, Choice, Volitionist, Attributionist, Hieronymi, Emotion, Desire, Answerability, Voluntary
Issue Date: 20-Apr-2018
Citation: YEO XIAO FENG KAINE (2018-04-20). RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT VOLITIONAL CONTROL. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: When are moral agents open to appropriate responses on the basis of what they do or how they are? That is, when are they morally responsible? Some--the volitionists--believe that it is only when agents possess volitional control in some relevant way. Others--the attributionists--disagree, for they believe that when an agent?s actions or states are indicative of the agent?s moral self, responsibility obtains even without volitional control. My project is threefold. First, I argue for attributionism over volitionism. Next, I show that Pamela Hieronymi's (2008) attributionist view is satisfactory, given three concerns in my paper. Finally, I briefly consider the prospect of extending Hieronymi's view to responsibility for emotions and desires, concluding that it seems as yet feasible.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/146628
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses (Restricted)

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