Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/14459
Title: Optimal timing of real estate development - A real options and game theoretical framework
Authors: CHU YONGQIANG
Keywords: real options, real estate development, asymmetric duopoly, incomplete information
Issue Date: 7-Jan-2005
Source: CHU YONGQIANG (2005-01-07). Optimal timing of real estate development - A real options and game theoretical framework. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This study is trying to apply the real options theory in real estate development, as real estate investment is irreversible and heterogeneous. This study extends the existing literature in the following directions: (i) a monopoly real options model is proposed to examine the optimal timing and intensity simultaneously; (ii) the symmetric duopoly model is extended to asymmetric duopoly games; (iii) the incomplete information is incorporated in examine the asymmetric modela?|The Monopolistic model shows that the uncertain exogenous economic shock and the demand factors contribute to the option value of real estate development. In the asymmetric model, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is derived under different levels of comparative advantage for two different developers. In the incomplete information model, a set of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is derived based on the results obtained in asymmetric duopoly model.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/14459
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
Final 11.pdf741.79 kBAdobe PDF

OPEN

NoneView/Download

Page view(s)

278
checked on Dec 11, 2017

Download(s)

190
checked on Dec 11, 2017

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.