Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/144414
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dc.titleHume's Theory of Justice: to Whom Are We Supposed to Be Just?
dc.contributor.authorMAH WAN YING SARA
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-04T09:13:10Z
dc.date.available2018-07-04T09:13:10Z
dc.date.issued2018-04-02
dc.identifier.citationMAH WAN YING SARA (2018-04-02). Hume's Theory of Justice: to Whom Are We Supposed to Be Just?. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/144414
dc.description.abstractHume’s theory of Justice was mainly discussed in the Treatise of Human Nature and in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. While his arguments focus on the nature of justice as being a virtue based on social conventions, and being directed towards public interest, fewer words were used to explain who constituted this society or public. The main chapters of this thesis aim to answer the question “To whom are we supposed to be just?” I argue that given his criteria for justice to be applied to civilised and equal people, Hume’s theory of justice presents many questions on what these criteria mean. Hume briefly discusses some cases in Enquiry 3.18-19, namely those of animals, barbarians, and women. Using his arguments, I also extend these cases to children and handicapped people since they in some way do not necessarily meet these criteria. In doing so, I attempt to provide a way for Hume to give a satisfactory explanation for whether we need to treat these people justly.
dc.typeThesis
dc.contributor.departmentPOLITICAL SCIENCE
dc.contributor.supervisorQu Hsueh Ming
dc.description.degreeBachelor's
dc.description.degreeconferredBachelor of Social Sciences (Honours) in Political Science
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses

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