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Title: Determining Socially Optimal Interchange Fees.
Authors: Tang Kai Ying
Keywords: card platforms, interchange fees, merchant discount rates
Issue Date: 6-Nov-2017
Source: Tang Kai Ying (2017-11-06). Determining Socially Optimal Interchange Fees.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis calibrates a model of a card payment system with data published by the Reserve Bank of Australia. Using the calibrated parameters, the welfare-maximizing interchange fee and the total user surplus-maximising interchange fee are calculated and compared to the unregulated level and regulated level. The results show that the regulated level of interchange fees in Australia can be justified by the welfare analysis, even though by chance, while the objective of maximising total user surplus would suggest interchange fees should be further lowered. The results are also used to characterize optimal interchange fees in Singapore's card payments market. Policy implications are discussed.
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses (Restricted)

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