BEYOND POWER PLAYS : WHY DO WEAKER STATES INK DEEP TRADE AGREEMENTS?

Abstract

Deep trade agreements have often been explicated with broader phenomena such as the rise of global production networks and multinational corporations, or by considering the impetuses of stronger states and their ability to compel others to sign deeper agreements. This paper sets forth a novel explanation for the rise of deep trade agreements, by considering how weaker signatories could be motivated to adopt complex regulatory regimes and economic reform in a bid to scale the developmental ladder. It submits that this motivation, or political will of weaker developing states, coupled with the existence of power asymmetries, results in the inking of deep trade agreements. A novel operationalization of political will for economic reform vis‐á‐vis the reporting of pertinent economic data, alongside additive indices measuring agreement depth is used within a quantitative, large‐n approach based on the gravity model. The study finds strong support for the synergistic nature of the commitments of weak states to reform and power asymmetry; positively impacting general trade agreement and investment provisions depth.