Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/138151
Title: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND POLITICAL CONNECTION: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS
Authors: WANG LONG
Keywords: Information Asymmetry, Learning, Commercial Real Estate, Corruption, Land, Political Economy
Issue Date: 22-Aug-2017
Source: WANG LONG (2017-08-22). INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND POLITICAL CONNECTION: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This study enriches our understanding of the information asymmetries between foreign and domestic investors in global real estate investments, as well as the privilege of political connections of SOEs in the land auctions of China. The first essay examines the effect of corruption in the host country on the real estate investments across 88 countries. This is the first study that explores whether the negative corruption-investment relationship relates to information asymmetries in corrupt countries. The second essay studies how investors’ learning from prior experience affects information asymmetries in commercial real estate market. The third essay investigates the price premiums paid by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and individuals, and then explores the underlying mechanisms that explain the price premiums.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/138151
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Restricted)

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