Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/13705
Title: Earnings management before and after CEO resignation
Authors: ZHI QIANG
Keywords: Earnings Management, Earnings Manipulation, CEO turnover, CEO
Issue Date: 10-Mar-2004
Source: ZHI QIANG (2004-03-10). Earnings management before and after CEO resignation. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This study examines the earnings management behavior of outgoing and incomingCEOs. The Jones Model is used to hypotheses that outgoing CEOs do not engage insignificant earnings management before resignation, and incoming CEOs manageearnings downwards in the quarter in which they are appointed as CEO and manipulateearnings upwards in the following quarter. The empirical evidence is consistent withmy hypotheses. My findings on outgoing CEOs are not consistent with Pourciau (1992)and further tests suggest that the contradictory results are due mainly to the inherentbias in Pourciaua??s research methodology.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/13705
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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