Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/13668
Title: The inconsistent cartesian dreaming argument
Authors: LIM ENG LEONG
Keywords: cartesian dreaming inconsistency descartes skeptic skepticism
Issue Date: 11-Jan-2004
Source: LIM ENG LEONG (2004-01-11). The inconsistent cartesian dreaming argument. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: A premise of the Cartesian Dreaming Argument is the claim that dreams are phenomenologically indistinguishable from waking experiences. My thesis focuses on how the skeptic arrives at this claim, and I argue that the claim is inconsistent with the premises used to derive it. This inconsistency runs as follows: if the claim were true then it cannot be known that dreams have occurred. I then consider several attempted solutions to this inconsistency problem, and conclude that they are all unsuccessful. Lastly, I offer an interpretation of the argument a?? as a reductio ad absurdum argument a?? that makes sense of this inconsistency.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/13668
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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