Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/134419
Title: NATURALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CATEGORICAL REASONS
Authors: NG HAN WEI MELVIN
Keywords: ethical naturalism, error theory, agent-neutral reasons
Issue Date: 4-Aug-2016
Source: NG HAN WEI MELVIN (2016-08-04). NATURALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CATEGORICAL REASONS. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: The thesis of this paper is that naturalism about reasons and the existence of categorical reasons are incompatible. The paper first lays out a general argument for the thesis, relying on the idea that a plausible account of reason must make it such that reasons are automatically relevant to agents’ practical deliberation – what I call the Minimal Condition. The general argument is then applied to five different accounts of reason in the literature – Christine Korsgaard’s and Alan Gewirth’s, representing a Kantian/rationalist approach, Philippa Foot’s, representing an Aristotelian approach, David Copp’s, representing a relativist approach, and Mark Schroeder’s, representing a Humean approach. It is argued that all five accounts fall into at least one of three fatal pitfalls for a naturalistic: first, they violate the Minimal Condition; second, they make or imply implausible natural claims; and third, they contain elements of unreduced normativity. Furthermore, these accounts mask their deficiencies by relying on quasi-normative terms. In the final chapter, the general argument is described as a clarification, explication and fortification of Mackie’s argument from queerness.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/134419
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