Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-006-9012-4
Title: Forms and objects of thought
Authors: Pelczar, M.W. 
Keywords: Propositional attitudes
Issue Date: Mar-2007
Source: Pelczar, M.W. (2007-03). Forms and objects of thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1) : 97-122. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-006-9012-4
Abstract: It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises. © Springer Science+Business Media 2007.
Source Title: Linguistics and Philosophy
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/130828
ISSN: 01650157
DOI: 10.1007/s10988-006-9012-4
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

5
checked on Mar 6, 2018

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

3
checked on Mar 6, 2018

Page view(s)

13
checked on Feb 25, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.