Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12047
Title: Communication and authority with a partially informed expert
Authors: Agastya, M.
Bag, P.K. 
Chakraborty, I. 
Issue Date: Mar-2014
Citation: Agastya, M., Bag, P.K., Chakraborty, I. (2014-03). Communication and authority with a partially informed expert. RAND Journal of Economics 45 (1) : 176-197. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12047
Abstract: A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa. © 2014, RAND.
Source Title: RAND Journal of Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124313
ISSN: 07416261
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12047
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