Arguments for Material Nihilism: Taking a Closer Look

Abstract

Material nihilism, also known as compositional nihilism, is the view that there are no such things as material objects with proper parts ? that is, there are no such things as physical composite objects as tables and mountains. In my paper, I will present and examine in detail three contemporary arguments often associated with the view. Peter van Inwagen argues for the view because he thinks it provides the best answer to what he terms the Special Composition Question. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no material composite objects on pain of causal overdetermination. And Peter Unger provides an updated twist of Sorites-style reasoning for material nihilism in what is known as the problem of the many. I will examine these arguments through the lens of reductionism; in doing so I will point to ways in which the ongoing debate over material nihilism can be further developed.