Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966924
DC Field | Value | |
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dc.title | Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing | |
dc.contributor.author | Yang, G. | |
dc.contributor.author | Tan, C.-H. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-12T07:16:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-12T07:16:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Yang, G.,Tan, C.-H. (2011). Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing. Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS 2011 : 71-79. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966924" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966924</a> | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781450305648 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/115500 | |
dc.description.abstract | In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user self-generated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and uncertified public key). Two types of adversaries are considered for certificateless cryptography: a Type-I adversary who can replace the user self-generated public key (in transmission or in a public directory), and a Type-II adversary who is an honest-but-curious KGC. In this paper, we present a formal study on certificateless key exchange (CLKE). We show that the conventional definition of Type-I and Type-II security may not be suitable for certificateless key exchange when considering the notion of forward secrecy which is important for key exchange protocols. We then present a new security model in which a single adversary (instead of Type-I and Type-II adversaries) is considered. We also construct a strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without expensive pairing operations. As far as we know, our proposed protocol is the first proven secure CLKE protocol without pairing. Copyright 2011 ACM. | |
dc.description.uri | http://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966924 | |
dc.source | Scopus | |
dc.type | Conference Paper | |
dc.contributor.department | TEMASEK LABORATORIES | |
dc.description.doi | 10.1145/1966913.1966924 | |
dc.description.sourcetitle | Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS 2011 | |
dc.description.page | 71-79 | |
dc.identifier.isiut | NOT_IN_WOS | |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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