Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.007
DC Field | Value | |
---|---|---|
dc.title | "Reverse" nested lottery contests | |
dc.contributor.author | Fu, Q. | |
dc.contributor.author | Lu, J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, Z. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-12T07:05:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-12T07:05:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-01 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Fu, Q., Lu, J., Wang, Z. (2014-01). "Reverse" nested lottery contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics 50 (1) : 128-140. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 03044068 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114924 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes a multi-prize "reverse" nested lottery contest model, which can be viewed as the "mirror image" of the conventional nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a). The reverse-lottery contest model determines winners by selecting losers based on contestants' one-shot effort through a hypothetical sequence of lotteries. We provide a microfoundation for the reverse-lottery contest from a perspective of (simultaneous) noisy performance ranking and establish that the model is underpinned by a unique performance evaluation rule. We further demonstrate that the noisy-ranking model can be interpreted intuitively as a "worst-shot" contest, in which contestants' performances are evaluated based on their most severe mistakes. The reverse-lottery contest model thus depicts a great variety of widely observed competitive activities of this nature. A handy closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium of the reverse-lottery contest is obtained. We show that the winner-take-all principle continues to hold in reverse-lottery contests. Moreover, we find that a reverse-lottery contest elicits more effort than a conventional lottery contest whenever the prizes available to contestants are relatively scarce. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. | |
dc.description.uri | http://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.007 | |
dc.source | Scopus | |
dc.subject | Contest elimination function | |
dc.subject | Imperfectly discriminatory contests | |
dc.subject | Least-favorable performance ranking | |
dc.subject | Multi-prize contest | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.department | STRATEGY AND POLICY | |
dc.description.doi | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.007 | |
dc.description.sourcetitle | Journal of Mathematical Economics | |
dc.description.volume | 50 | |
dc.description.issue | 1 | |
dc.description.page | 128-140 | |
dc.description.coden | JMECD | |
dc.identifier.isiut | 000331986500012 | |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
Show simple item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.