Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12035
Title: First-price sealed-bid tender versus English open auction: Evidence from land auctions
Authors: Chow, Y.L.
Ooi, J.T.L. 
Issue Date: 2014
Citation: Chow, Y.L., Ooi, J.T.L. (2014). First-price sealed-bid tender versus English open auction: Evidence from land auctions. Real Estate Economics 42 (2) : 253-278. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12035
Abstract: This article compares whether the first-price sealed-bid tender or the ascending English open auction generates higher revenue for the seller. Using a unique set of data for land sales and accounting for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, our results show that the first-price sealed-bid tender generates a lower land price, in the range of 1.2-9.6%, than the English open auction. Our results validate the theoretical prediction that open auctions result in higher prices because bidders can infer other bidders' information by observing their bids in the common value auction paradigm. © 2013 American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
Source Title: Real Estate Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/114004
ISSN: 15406229
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12035
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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