Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/107400
Title: Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament
Authors: LIU XUYUAN
Keywords: contest, tournament, all pay auction, scoring contest, incomplete information, strategy
Issue Date: 1-Aug-2014
Source: LIU XUYUAN (2014-08-01). Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: My dissertation contains four essays on strategy and incentive in contest and tournament. The first chapter studies optimal contest design in environments where the organizer commits to allocate a given set of heterogeneous prizes and each contestant wins one and only one prize. Chapter 2 investigates optimal prize rationing rule in all pay auctions with incomplete information. Chapter 3 is about R&D contests with imperfect quality signals. Chapter 4 focuses on the behavioral strategy of contest intermediaries.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/107400
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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