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|Title:||Pure strategies in games with private information|
|Source:||Khan, M.A.,Sun, Y. (1995). Pure strategies in games with private information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 24 (7) : 633-653. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.|
|Abstract:||Pure strategy equilibria of finite player games with informational constraints have been discussed under the assumptions of finite actions, and of independence and diffuseness of information. We present a mathematical framework, based on the notion of a distribution of a correspondence, that enables us to handle the case of countably infinite actions. In this context, we extend the Radner-Rosenthal theorems on the purification of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, and present a direct proof, as well as a generalized version of Schmeidler's large games theorem, on the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Our mathematical results pertain to the set of distributions induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range, and rely on the Bollobás-Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma. © 1995.|
|Source Title:||Journal of Mathematical Economics|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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