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Title: Pure strategies in games with private information
Authors: Khan, M.A.
Sun, Y. 
Keywords: Atomless
Large games
Private information
Pure strategies
Issue Date: 1995
Citation: Khan, M.A.,Sun, Y. (1995). Pure strategies in games with private information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 24 (7) : 633-653. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Pure strategy equilibria of finite player games with informational constraints have been discussed under the assumptions of finite actions, and of independence and diffuseness of information. We present a mathematical framework, based on the notion of a distribution of a correspondence, that enables us to handle the case of countably infinite actions. In this context, we extend the Radner-Rosenthal theorems on the purification of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, and present a direct proof, as well as a generalized version of Schmeidler's large games theorem, on the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Our mathematical results pertain to the set of distributions induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range, and rely on the Bollobás-Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma. © 1995.
Source Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
ISSN: 03044068
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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