Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/103677
Title: On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria
Authors: Khan, M.A.
Rath, K.P.
Sun, Y. 
Keywords: Private information game
Pure strategy equilibria
Theorems
Issue Date: Apr-1999
Citation: Khan, M.A.,Rath, K.P.,Sun, Y. (1999-04). On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics 31 (3) : 341-359. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: We present an example of a two-person game of private information in which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Our example satisfies all the hypotheses of the existence theorems present in the literature on the subject of pure strategy equilibria, except for the fact that the action set of each player is given by the interval [-1,1]. As such, it illustrates the limitations that pertain to the purification of equilibria in a standard setting.
Source Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/103677
ISSN: 03044068
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Page view(s)

39
checked on Oct 12, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.