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|Title:||Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces|
|Source:||Khan, M.A.,Sun, Y. (1999-05). Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces. Journal of Mathematical Economics 31 (4) : 455-492. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.|
|Abstract:||We present a particular class of measure spaces, hyperfinite Loeb spaces, as a model of situations where individual players are strategically negligible, as in large non-anonymous games, or where information is diffused, as in games with imperfect information. We present results on the existence of Nash equilibria in both kinds of games. Our results cover the case when the action sets are taken to be the unit interval, results now known to be false when they are based on more familiar measure spaces such as the Lebesgue unit interval. We also emphasize three criteria for the modelling of such game-theoretic situations - asymptotic implementability, homogeneity and measurability - and argue for games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces on the basis of these criteria. In particular, we show through explicit examples that a sequence of finite games with an increasing number of players or sample points cannot always be represented by a limit game on a Lebesgue space, and even when it can be so represented, the limit of an existing approximate equilibrium may disappear in the limit game. Thus, games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces constitute the 'right' model even if one is primarily interested in capturing the asymptotic nature of large but finite game-theoretic phenomena.|
|Source Title:||Journal of Mathematical Economics|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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